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ABSTRACT 
The National Exercise Program serves as the primary 
means for training national leaders and department and 
agency staff members.  Additionally, it serves in promoting 
collaboration among stakeholders and partners at all levels 
of government with homeland security missions.  Although 
the National Strategy for Homeland Security directs a 
National Exercise Program and DHS codifies this program in 
doctrine, it is continually a work in progress.  This paper 
identifies and discusses four key areas which must be 
addressed in order to improve the National Exercise 
Program.  These four key areas are Interagency 
Participation, Stability and Predictability, Funding, and 
Corrective Actions.  These four areas are inter-related in 
that actions occurring in one area can have an impact in 
any one of the other three areas.  Although DHS has 
established a framework for administering the NEP, many 
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I. REVISING NATIONAL-LEVEL EXERCISES  
A.   INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is 
responsible for establishing and maintaining the National 
Exercise Program (NEP), as specified in the original 
National Strategy for Homeland Security published in 
2002.1,2  NEP serves as the primary means for training 
national leaders and department and agency staff members.  
Additionally, it serves in promoting collaboration among 
stakeholders and partners at all levels of government with 
homeland security missions. National-level exercises 
provide the vehicle for conducting large-scale events 
testing collective preparedness, improving 
interoperability, and building strong teams across all 
levels of government and the private sector.3  DHS manages 
national-level exercises at the federal-level in order to 
effectively and efficiently administer the limited 
resources and funding available for such efforts. These 
exercises generally involve department and agency leaders 
and staffs, plus entities of two or more federal agencies, 
and interaction with multiple regions and states.4 
                     
1 National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington D.C: 2002), 45. 
2 The 2002 Version of the National Strategy for Homeland Security was 
replaced in October 2007. 
3 Department of Homeland Security, National Exercise Program 
Implementation Plan (Washington D.C.: 2007), 6 (accessed June 15, 
2007). 
4 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and 
Evaluation Program, Volume 1: HSEEP Overview and Exercise Program 
Management (Washington D.C.: February 2007), 12, 
https://hseep.dhs.gov/support/HSEEP%20Volume%20I%20021507%20(Final%20Re
vision%20February%202007).pdf (accessed October 6, 2007). 
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Planning requirements, participants, and complexity of 
scenarios have evolved since the first national-level 
exercise in 2000.5  Part of this evolution is due to the 
maturing of DHS and its National Exercise Program along 
with the formalization of policies, procedures and 
operations necessary to conduct civil support and homeland 
security and defense missions.  Another important reason 
for this evolution is a result of the problems faced by 
local, state and federal responders and agencies in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the impetus to institute 
almost immediate fixes for the problems incurred from that 
response.  For these reasons, this paper identifies the 
following four areas that our National leaders must revise 
in order to improve the training and preparedness of 
national partners and agencies in national-level exercises6:   
• Interagency participation 
• Stability and predictability 
• Funding 
• Corrective action process 
These items are not isolated from one another.  For 
the most part, all four areas are inter-related and the 
effects of one area can influence one or more of the other 
three areas.  For example, funding shortfalls usually 
affect the other three areas.  
  
                     
5 This Exercise was the first Top Official (TOPOFF) exercise 
conducted in May 2000.  Hereinafter, this exercise will be referred to 
as TOPOFF 1. 
6 These revisions are intended to supplement the Hurricane Katrina 
Lessons Learned. 
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B.   RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question this thesis primarily addresses 
is how should National-level Exercises better prepare 
federal departments and agencies to respond to Incidents of 
National Significance7. 
C.   PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROJECT 
Our Government must have a challenging and realistic 
exercise program in order to successfully fulfill Homeland 
Security requirements to prevent, detect, deter, and 
respond against terrorist attacks while simultaneously 
being fully prepared to respond to catastrophic natural 
disasters.  National-level exercises test collective 
federal-level preparedness, improve interoperability, and 
build strong teams across all levels of government and the 
private sector.   This document identifies four key areas 
requiring improvements intended to increase the 
effectiveness of national-level exercises for federal 
departments and agencies.  These revisions require federal 
departments and agencies to train during exercises in order 
to prepare them to realistically respond to catastrophic 
events.  The importance of addressing these items has a 
direct impact on preparedness of the federal department and 
agencies to respond to natural or man-made disaster events, 
when local and state responders are unable to do so.   
D.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
The National Exercise Program is a new and developing 
program.  Since the tragic events of 9/11, only a handful 
                     
7 The NRP defines Incidents of National Significance as follows:  
“An actual or potential high-impact event that requires a coordinated 
and effective response by and appropriate combination of Federal, 
State, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and/or private-sector entities 
in order to save lives and minimize damage, and provide the basis for 
long-term community recovery and mitigation activities.”  
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of national-level exercises have taken place under the 
auspices of DHS and its national-level exercise and 
training program.8  Due to the recent development of these 
exercises and the low number of exercises conducted, there 
is not a plethora of information on this subject.  Of the 
information that does exist, most is in the form of 
government directives, reports, or summaries.  Some of 
these documents provide the policy and implementation for 
national-level exercises.  Other documents are post-
exercise reports that identify and document organizational 
strengths and weaknesses observed during the exercise(s).  
Still other documents include government and congressional 
oversight reports that influence either national-level 
exercises or preparedness efforts, or both.  Using these 
other types of documents, although not derived from 
exercises, we can benchmark the progress of participants 
when conducting national-level exercises.  Based on this 
literature search conducted, the literature has been broken 
down into three categories, as follows:  (a) National-level 
Policies and Directives, (b) Post-exercise reports, 
summaries and reviews, and (c) Supplementary documents 
influencing national-level exercises. 
1. National-Level Policies and Directives   
Homeland Security Presidential Directive #8, dated 
December 17, 2003, serves as the primary policy for 
establishing national-level exercises.  HSPD-8 assigns 
responsibility to DHS for developing and implementing a 
                     
8 These exercises are:  TOPOFF 3 (April 2005), DP-04 (2004), AS-05 
(April 2005 – combined with TOPOFF 3) , AS-06 (May 2006), VS-07 
(December 2006), AS-07 (May 2007) and TOPOFF IV/VS-08 (October 2007).  
These exercises were not designated as National-level exercises but had 
participation by 2 or more Federal Departments and/or participation by 
state agencies. 
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national-level training and exercise program.9  
Specifically, HSPD-8 identifies three key actions DHS must 
accomplish in the area of Training and Exercises, as 
follows: 
1. Establish a comprehensive training program. 
2. Establish a “national program and a multi-year 
planning system to conduct homeland security preparedness-
related exercises that reinforces identified training 
standards and provides for evaluation of readiness.”10 
3. Develop a process to collect, analyze, and 
disseminate lessons learned, best practices, and 
information from exercises, training events, research, and 
other sources, including actual incidents, and establish 
procedures to improve national preparedness to prevent, 
respond to, and recover from major events.11 
In addition to establishing the primary policy for the 
National Exercise Program, HSPD-8 also establishes policy 
and requirements for DHS to develop and submit a National 
Preparedness Goal to the President through the Homeland 
Security Council.  The specific purpose of the National 
Preparedness Goal is to, “ensure the preparedness of the 
Nation to prevent, respond to, and recover from threatened 
and actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and 
                     
9 The development of a National Preparedness Goal was directed in 
HSPD-8.  The National Preparedness Goal was published in Final Draft in 
December 2005.   
10 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 8: National 
Preparedness (Washington D.C. 2003), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html 
(accessed November 22, 2006.) 
11 Ibid. 
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other emergencies.”12  HSPD-8 also directs that the National 
Preparedness Goal include “readiness metrics and elements 
that support the national preparedness goal including 
standards for preparedness assessments and strategies, and 
a system for assessing the Nation's overall preparedness to 
respond to major events.”13  Additionally, it directs other 
federal departments and agencies to support the National 
Preparedness Goal, including “adoption of quantifiable 
performance measurements in the areas of training, 
planning, equipment, and exercises for federal incident 
management and asset preparedness.”14 
The Target Capabilities List (TCL) is the primary 
source for readiness metrics required in the National 
Preparedness Goal.  Stakeholders can use these metrics to 
measure readiness outcomes in terms of availability, 
efficiency and effectiveness.15  The National Preparedness 
Goal along with capabilities-based planning tools provides 
assessment standards for national preparedness.  These 
tools include the fifteen National Planning Scenarios, the 
Universal Task List (UTL), and TCL.16  Leaders in federal 
departments and agencies use these metrics and standards to 
measure government readiness and performance resulting from 
participation in national-level exercises.   
The National Exercise Program Implementation Plan is 
the latest of documents which provides specific guidance 
                     
12 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal 
(Draft) (Washington D.C.: 2005), iii, (accessed November 20, 2006). 
13 HSPD-8. 
14 Ibid. 
15 National Preparedness Goal, 21. 
16 Ibid. 
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and requirements for the National Exercise Program.  The 
implementation plan identifies planning, scheduling and 
budgeting requirements for all exercises under the NEP.  
Since this is a recent document (published in April 2007), 
most of the requirements have not been fully implemented. 
2. Post-Exercise Reports, Summaries, and Reviews 
A major post-exercise outcome from each exercise is 
the Facilitated After-Action Review (FAAR).  FAAR’s occur 
immediately following each exercise and normally include 
senior personnel representing each major participant 
involved in the exercise.  The primary purpose of a FAAR is 
for senior leaders to identify and describe major strengths 
and weaknesses occurring in the exercise.  Organizations 
can then use these strengths and weaknesses as a foundation 
for lessons learned.  FAAR documents usually do not contain 
significant details, but rather bullet comments describing 
observations.  While bullet comments do not provide in-
depth information, they do identify the overall strength or 
weakness within the organization.  At the very least, these 
bullet comments may identify organizational trends 
occurring through several exercises. 
Lessons-learned databases are viable sources of 
information for identifying specific practices, both right 
and wrong, which occur in organizations.  These products, 
unlike the bullet-based FAAR products detail specific 
policies, practices and/or procedures that enhance or 
detract from an organization’s effectiveness towards 
meeting their mission requirements.  Not only do they 
identify weaknesses, but they also identify actions 
developed to correct these weaknesses.  Two common lessons 
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learned databases used are DHS’ Lessons Learned Information 
Sharing (LLIS) and DOD’s Joint Universal Lessons Learned 
System (JULLS). 
Exercise Summary Reports (ESR) are important as a 
final collective report for a particular exercise and serve 
as a continuity document for future exercises.  ESRs 
identify the training objectives of all participants, 
observations made of participants during the exercise, and 
after-action reviews of the participants.   Vigilant 
Overview 04-2 (VO 04-2) and Unified Defense 04 (UD 04) 
exercises17, conducted principally at NORAD-USNORTHCOM 
Headquarters in Colorado Springs, CO, Washington, DC, and 
the States of Texas and Alaska were the first exercises to 
publish an ESR.  This exercise and its accompanying summary 
report was particularly important since it was the first 
interagency exercise involving federal departments and 
United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the first 
exercise involving the newly established Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD).  
Exercise Summary Reports for other national-level exercises 
such as Ardent-Sentry 2005, Vigilant Shield 2006, Ardent-
Sentry 2006, and Vigilant Shield 2007 provide background 
information and lessons learned derived from these 
exercises.  Actual observations made by trained observers 
during the exercise form the basis for these exercises 
summary reports.  These reports are critical for 
establishing the training effectiveness and therefore, the 
preparedness of those participating in the exercises. 
                     
17 These exercises were conducted concurrently. 
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In November 2005, the Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) for DHS prepared a review to assess the efforts of 
DHS’ Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 
Preparedness (SLGCP) to develop, plan, coordinate, and 
conduct the Top Officials 3 (TOPOFF 3) exercise.18  TOPOFF 
3, occurring in April 2005, demonstrated the need for 
federal participants to be knowledgeable on their functions 
and the processes during disaster operations.  This 
document is important for two reasons: (1) It identifies 
numerous problems associated with federal-level 
participation in national-level exercises; and (2) The 
document originates from within DHS.    This report 
identified the absolute need to coordinate supporting 
efforts across all levels of government.19  
3. Supplementary Documents Impacting National-level 
Exercises   
The 9/11 Commission Report is an important document 
for determining whether recommendations made in the report 
have been implemented and whether they have increased our 
preparedness to prevent, detect, deter, and respond to 
terrorist attacks. For example, the report identifies that 
directing and executing paramilitary operations should 
shift from the CIA to DOD.20  Based on this recommendation 
                     
18 Top Officials (TOPOFF) Exercises are congressionally mandated 
exercises requiring Federal Agency officials to participate in nation-
level exercises. 
19 Richard Skinner, A Review of the Top Officials 3 Exercise 
(Washington D.C.: 2005), 21, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_06-07_Nov05.pdf (accessed 
November 20, 2006). 
20 The 9/11 Commission Report:  Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2004), 415, 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm (accessed February 
3, 2007). 
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and that Special Operations Command is the lead DOD agency 
for Counter-terrorism activities, exercises can be designed 
to stress operational considerations for these type of 
missions. 
Another recommendation found in the 9/11 Commission 
report is the need to balance security with shared 
knowledge.21  Many times during exercises, information 
sharing comes to a complete halt due to classification 
issues.  These issues involve information that is 
classified or information that is not classified but is 
transmitted on classified computer and communication 
systems.  In either case, outside agencies usually do not 
have access to the information.  As a result, information 
is not shared which affects the ability of the agency to 
act. 
The Whitehouse Report, The Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina:  Lessons Learned, identifies federal 
interagency coordination as a significant issue during 
relief efforts.  The report further indicates that federal 
officials lacked a fundamental understanding of the 
National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS).22  This lack of understanding is 
partially a result of insufficient training which could be 
rectified through participation in national-level 
exercises.   
 
                     
21 The 9/11 Commission Report, 417. 
22 White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:  Lessons 
Learned (Washington D.C.: February 2006), 70, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/(accessed 
November 17, 2006). 
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E.   SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
1. Literature 
Currently, there is limited information available on 
national level exercises.  The significance of this 
research is that it will identify and consolidate available 
information in the form of legislation, policies, 
documents, and personal interviews.  This will assist 
practitioners in providing future policy changes to the 
national exercise program and/or future exercises.   This 
is important considering as this program matures, changes 
to the program and its exercises will be necessary in order 
to keep them relevant and improve preparedness. 
2. Future Research Efforts 
The significance of this research will likely assist 
future research efforts of others due to the consolidation 
of the limited information available.  Again, the 
development of the national exercise program is an 
evolutionary process, which must change with future 
requirements and challenges.  As such, the research 
conducted will serve as a baseline of research and assist 
future efforts towards changing and improving the national 
exercise program. 
3. Immediate Consumer/Customer 
The immediate consumers or customers of this research 
are the participants in Tier I and II exercises.  This 
research will be important in developing future training 
programs and exercises involving those organizations.  
Another important consumer/customer is DOD as they have an 
important role in both homeland defense and support of 
civil authorities which play a large part during National-
level Exercises.  Included within DOD is the Joint Staff, 
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the services (Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines), and 
other major organizations such as US Transportation Command 
(USTRANSCOM). 
4. Homeland Security Practitioners and National 
Leaders 
The research will also assist practitioners involved 
in homeland security, mostly at the federal level in DHS.  
It will provide them the baseline information for further 
research and development of the national exercise program 
and changes they need to make in order to keep the program 
current.  This research can certainly benefit national 
leaders inasmuch as it exposes the seams within our federal 
system affecting preparedness in responding to incidents of 
national significance.  It can also benefit Congress since 
they established the first requirement for national-level 
exercises through Top Official (TOPOFF) exercises plus they 
provide oversight in our Nation’s preparedness.  
Additionally, they are responsible for appropriating funds 
to conduct National-level Exercises. 
F. TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS OR ANSWERS 
This effort has revealed four key areas in National-
level Exercises DHS must revise in order to improve the 
training and preparedness of national partners and 
agencies.23  These four areas are:  
• Interagency participation 
• Stability and Predictability 
• Funding 
• Corrective action process 
                     
23 These revisions are intended to supplement the Hurricane Katrina 
Lessons Learned. 
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Revising these four areas is important because the 
changes implemented will add rigor to the National Exercise 
Program and sufficiently challenge federal leaders, 
departments, and agencies during national-level exercises.  
Implementing these revisions into the National Exercise 
Program will improve our ability to interact horizontally 
with federal departments and agencies as well as vertically 
with state and private sector entities. 
G. PAPER ORGANIZATION 
To provide context for the reader, Chapters II through 
V discuss the key areas in which National-level Exercises 
must be examined and possibly revised.  Chapter II 
discusses Interagency Participation in detail.  Chapter III 
discusses requirements for achieving stability and 
predictability in National-level Exercises.  Chapter IV 
talks about the need for funding and improvements to ensure 
exercise funding requirements are met.  Chapter V examines 
the lesson learned and corrective action process required 
to ensure improper practices are collected, corrected, 
implemented, and shared.  Finally, Chapter VI provides 
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II. INTERAGENCY PARTICIPATION 
A. OVERVIEW   
Achieving interagency participation during national-
level exercises is vitally important for fully testing our 
federal government leaders, staffs, and policies.  The need 
to exercise and train on national response actions is 
crucial in building a readiness posture capable of 
projecting a synchronized federal response during an 
operation requiring federal assistance.  While this concept 
seems reasonable and intuitive, achieving interagency 
participation during exercises has been extremely 
problematic.   
Since TOPOFF 1 and until recently, the requirement for 
federal interagency participation had formally not existed.  
As stated in Chapter I, HSPD-8, published in December 2003, 
directed DHS to establish a national exercise program and 
multi-year planning system in collaboration with state and 
local agencies.  It also directed federal departments and 
agencies to participate in the process of designating 
national-level exercises and creating an exercise master 
calendar.  It further required that, at the time of 
designating these exercises, the department or agency must 
also state its level of participation in these exercises.24  
However, HSPD-8 did not establish any requirements or 
conditions by which a federal department or agency was 
required to participate in any national-level exercise.  
Therefore, the decision to participate and the level of 
participation was primarily a decision made by each 
                     
24 HSPD-8. 
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department or agency with no check or balance from an 
oversight body to determine if the level of participation 
was appropriate.25   
B. WHY INTERAGENCY PARTICIPATION IS IMPORTANT 
Since TOPOFF 1, follow-on national exercises have 
clearly shown the need for interagency participation.  Two 
key requirements inherent to these large-scale exercises 
create this need:  (1) A necessity to employ, test, and 
interpret federal policies and procedures by those federal 
departments and agencies responsible for such policies and 
procedures and (2) The interaction necessary between 
multiple federal agencies responsible for specific 
actions.26  In the case of the first requirement, one of the 
primary goals of a national level exercise is to test 
national policies involving response operations.  Mr. Bill 
McNally, Director of DHS’ NEP states, “The real focus is on 
senior leadership.  The whole legislation that drove TOPOFF 
came from other exercises in the past where we looked at 
operational responses but we never engaged senior 
leadership and some of the decisions that would need to be 
made.”27  Engaging senior leaders and exercising decision-
makers during exercises ensures whether the policies and 
procedures established are relevant and in the best 
interest of the United States and its citizens.  We simply 
                     
25 NORAD-USNORTHCOM, NORAD-USNORTHCOM Exercise Issues -  Worldwide 
Joint Training and Scheduling Conference (Peterson AFB, CO, March 2006) 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/wjtsc06_1nncipr.ppt (accessed 
November 23, 2006). 
26 National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, 2. 
27 Mr. William NcNally, (Director, National Exercise Program, 
Department of Homeland Security), interview with the author, Colorado 
Springs, CO September 13, 2007. 
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cannot wait for a National crisis or disaster to occur to 
see if the policies and procedures established by the 
Federal Government work.   
Regarding the second requirement, interaction between 
governmental organizations is important for understanding 
an organization’s operating procures, identifying contacts, 
and identifying and rectifying interoperability problems.   
Having actual policy-makers, decision-makers and their 
staffs participate is important for getting actual guidance 
and interpretation of policies tested during the exercise.  
Replicating this function is not feasible since the 
replicated response may not be relevant or reflect the true 
intent of the policy, procedure, or more importantly, the 
policy-maker.  Additionally, outside response cells cannot 
replicate interaction between multiple federal agencies or 
their operations centers.  By not having the full or 
correct interagency participation, our departments and 
agencies miss a big opportunity for improving our federal 
capability to respond to catastrophic events when they 
occur. 
The need for adequate interagency participation during 
national-level exercises certainly manifested itself with 
the haphazard federal response to Hurricane Katrina in 
2005.  The Whitehouse Report, The Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina:  Lessons Learned, identified federal 
interagency coordination as a significant issue during 
relief efforts.  The report further indicated that federal 
officials lacked a fundamental understanding of the 
National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident 
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Management System (NIMS).28  This lack of understanding was 
largely a result of insufficient training and participation 
in national-level exercises.   
C. INTERAGENCY PARTICIPATION IN PAST EXERCISES   
“Participation by the Departments and Agencies at the 
highest level of Government... that’s been one of the 
weakest point of National-level Exercises in the past,”29 
states Mr. Gene Pino, Director of Training and Exercises at 
US Northern Command.  The need for full interagency 
participation in national level exercises is nothing new.  
As stated in Chapter I, the first TOPOFF exercise occurred 
in 2000 and involved many different federal-level 
participants.  An important focus of this TOPOFF Exercise 
was to review the interfaces and relationships between 
participating agencies and their senior officials and 
“identify any seams, gaps, and redundancy in 
responsibilities that affect decision-making and subsequent 
actions directed to resolve the scope of consequences 
resulting from the simulated attacks.”30   
The observations and comments from TOPOFF 1 showed the 
importance of interagency participation and highlighted 
weaknesses which occurred due to a lack of interagency 
training.   
Getting the senior officials from Departments and 
Agencies to participate in the National-level Exercise has 
                     
28 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:  Lessons Learned, 73. 
29 Mr. Gene Pino, (Director, Training and Exercises), United States 
Northern Command), interview with the author, Colorado Springs, CO 
March 2, 2007. 
30 The National Response Team, TOPOFF 2000 and National Capital 
Region (NCR) After-Action Report, (Washington D.C.: 2001), 1,  
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dhs/TOPOFF-2000-AAR.PDF (accessed 
October 6, 2007). 
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not occurred on the scale necessary to explore and test 
National policies and procedures.  Although departments and 
agencies have participated in past national-level 
exercises, many of these participants served in a limited 
role, such as a response cell or just a representative 
subject matter expert (SME).  As Pino states, “You did not 
get the level of participation at the policy level and 
often times, you didn’t get the level of participation 
necessary at what we would call the operational level.”31  
Although organizations must tailor their participation in 
these exercises based on the scenarios, they must also 
ensure adequate representation in order to explore the 
seams and weaknesses of our federal policies and 
operations.  This includes using “real” operations centers 
during an exercise and not just replicating their 
activities. 
Past exercises have clearly shown a lack of training 
and coordination between departments and agencies which 
have participated.  TOPOFF 3, occurring in April 2005, 
demonstrated the need for federal participants to be 
knowledgeable on their functions and the processes during 
disaster operations.32 During the exercise, federal 
departments and agencies provided assets and resources to a 
state that did not request them.  A mobile 10,000-bed 
hospital facility with prophylaxes deployed to the State of 
New Jersey without their consent or knowledge.  As a 
result, the State and its local governments were unprepared 
                     
31 Pino Interview, Colorado Springs, CO March 2, 2007. 
32 Skinner, Review, 21. 
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to use the asset and were unclear on the financial and 
staffing support responsibilities required for its use.33 
Reasons for this lack of interagency participation 
vary.  One reason was that, there is no dedicated funding 
for departments and agencies to support their participation 
in the exercises.  In order for federal organizations to 
participate in these large-scale exercises, they usually 
have to use existing funds from within their organizations.  
This “out-of-hide” funding required of federal 
organizations has some effect on their participation in 
national level exercises.  Another reason was that there 
was no policy in place to require federal organizations to 
participate.  As stated previously, HSPD-8 did not require 
Federal Departments and Agencies to participate.  It only 
required them to state their level of participation.   
D. UNITED KINGDOM NATIONAL EXERCISES 
The United Kingdom (UK) also has a national exercise 
program which is somewhat similar to our exercise program 
in the US, and provides a benchmark.  The Exercise Program 
in the UK is the responsibility of the Home Office.  On 
their website, the UK Home Office states it is, “… the 
government department responsible for leading the national 
effort to protect the public from terrorism, crime and 
anti-social behaviour.34  The Government and the emergency 
services regularly practice responses to a range of 
incidents, including natural disasters, accidents and 
terrorist incidents.  Unlike the U.S.’ national exercise 
program which has been in existence since 2000, the United 
                     
33 Skinner, Review, 21. 
34 United Kingdom Home Office, “About Us,” 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/(accessed February 28, 2008). 
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Kingdom’s exercise program has been running for more than 
30 years.35  Just as the U.S. national exercises test our 
federal level departments and agencies, these exercises 
also test the UK government’s ability to respond to 
terrorist incidents and their aftermath and identify ways 
to improve federal response to such events. 
As a result of these 30 years of experience in the UK, 
they have integrated their government departments much more 
effectively into their exercise program.  Counter-terrorism 
and natural disaster exercises are an important part of 
their contingency planning and allow them to “prepare for 
when the worst happens.”36  These exercises enable the Home 
office and other government departments to test security-
related systems thoroughly, train frontline responders such 
as police, ambulance and fire staff and highlight 
vulnerabilities in their plans.37 
Every year the UK’s exercise program includes three 
annual large-scale live exercises, which involve police 
forces, other government departments and agencies testing 
counter-terrorist contingency plans.  Inclusive to their 
program is the involvement and strategic level decision 
making by senior government officials.  This regular 
practice of involving UK government departments and senior 
government officials in large-scale exercises provides a 
solid foundation for developing working relationships 
throughout the government and implementing and testing 
                     
35 United Kingdom Home Office, “Counter-terrorism Exercises,” 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/protecting-the-uk/counter-
terrorism-exercises/?version=1 (accessed February 28, 2008). 
36 UK Home Office, “Counter-terrorism Exercises.” 
37 Ibid. 
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policy decisions involving preparedness and response.  In 
essence, it breaks down the bureaucratic barriers which 
exist within governments. The U.K. sets a good example for 
continual interagency participation in national exercises.  
This is the type of interagency participation that must 
take place with exercises in the U.S.   
The effectiveness of the UK’s exercise program can 
easily be determined based on a recent large-scale 
exercise, “Winter Willow”.  The UK designed this exercise 
to “fully test [their] ability to manage the effects of an 
influenza pandemic by playing out the decision-making 
process at national, regional and local levels, when there 
are widespread cases across the country.”38  Based on a 
regional health authority report, Exercise Winter Willow 
was the largest ever-contingency exercise to take place in 
the UK involving participants from local, regional and 
national level public and private organizations.39  It was a 
very successful exercise both nationally and regionally in 
that it “strengthened excellent working relationships 
across the health sector with the Government Office 
Regional Resilience Team and other partners in emergency 
planning community.”40  Our federal departments and agencies 
should use this UK example of interagency participation in 
                     
38 United Kingdom Cabinet Office, Exercise Winter Willow,  
http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/exercises/nationalcasestudi
es/winter_willow.aspx (accessed 29 Feb 2007). 
39 Yorkshire and the Humber Strategic Health Authority, Update on 
Pandemic Influenza, (June 2007), 
http://www.yorksandhumber.nhs.uk/Library/BoardMeetings-
docs/2007_06_05/Papers/Enc%20H%20-%20Pandemic%20Influenza%20Update.doc, 




large-scale exercises to must continually participate in 
national-level exercises to be truly effective.  
E. CURRENT DHS NATIONAL EXERCISE PROGRAM POLICIES 
In April 2007, DHS published the National Exercise 
Program Implementation Plan (NEP IMPLAN).  DHS published 
this IMPLAN as a result of the lessons learned from 
Hurricane Katrina.  Recommendation 111, Titled, “DHS should 
establish a National Exercise and Evaluation Program 
(NEEP),” recommends DHS establish such a program to 
supplement the NEP.  The intent was to establish an 
exercise doctrine for all exercises which includes, 
“domestic and international exercises that enable Federal, 
State and local governments to improve interagency 
coordination across all types of crises.”41   
1. Exercise Methodology 
The NEP IMPLAN establishes the framework for exercise 
doctrine and methodology throughout the DHS NEP.  The 
primary focus of this framework is to plan and conduct, “a 
program of exercises designed for the participation of 
heads of Federal departments and agencies and other key 
officials, which examines and evaluates emerging national-
level policy issues.”42  The Plan further lays out five main 
requirements for federal government officers regarding the 
National Exercise Program.  These requirements are as 
follows: 
a. Exercise responsibilities under the National 
Response Plan and other strategies, as appropriate;  
                     
41 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:  Lessons Learned, 119. 
42 National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, 1. 
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b. Examine emerging policy issues through the conduct 
of exercises in a comprehensive manner on a routine basis;  
c. Incorporate current threat and vulnerability 
assessments into exercise objectives and planning efforts;  
d. Develop a corrective action process to ensure 
lessons from exercises are either sustained or improved as 
appropriate; and  
e. Achieve national unity among appropriate Federal, 
State, local, private sector, and partner nation entities.43 
2. Exercise Tiers 
The newly published NEP IMPLAN identifies different 
categories or tiers for exercises which indicate a scale of 
participation in exercises by participants at the federal, 
state and local levels.  These tiers establish the priority 
and level for participation, with Tier I as the highest 
priority exercise for participation and Tier IV as the 
lowest. These tiers are determined from an interagency 
judgment based on how closely these tiers align with 
federal government-wide strategic and policy priorities.44  
The table below summarizes these tiers and their elements:  
                     
43 National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, 2. 
44 Ibid., 4.  
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Figure 1.  National Exercise Program Tiers45 
 
These tiers not only delineate the level of exercise, 
but they signify interagency participation requirements and 
the intended audience.  Exercises requiring interagency 
participation are those in tiers I and II.  Tier I 
Exercises are based on White House directed, government-
wide strategy and policy issues and include all appropriate 
Department and Agency heads (or their deputies) and all 
necessary operations centers.  DHS endorses Tier II 
exercises through the NEP process as meriting priority for 
interagency participation and focus on strategy and policy 
issues.  Participation is through the National Simulation 
Center or as determined by each Department or Agency's 
leadership.   
                     
45 National Exercise Program Briefing. (Washington D.C.: Department 
of Homeland Security), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/nep.pdf 
(accessed October 10, 2007). 
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The following table depicts these additional elements 








Required Federal, State 
and Local 
Dept. agency heads 









through the Nat’l 
Sim Center. 
III 




Federal Dept or 
Agency is 
discretionary. 
IV N/A State and Local 
 
Table 1.   National Exercise Tiers46 
 
3. Interagency Exercise Funding 
The newly published NEP IMPLAN requires federal 
departments and agencies provide budget requests for their 
participation in Tier 1 exercises.47  Following this budget 
submission, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
reviews budget submissions to ensure they address NEP 
requirements.  This review is not necessarily to ensure 
that departments and agencies meet exercise participation  
 
                     
46 National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, 4. 
47 National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, 16. 
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requirements, but rather to fill data requirements for the 
President’s Management Agenda.48,49 
According to DHS’ NEP Implementation Plan, Departments 
and  Agencies must submit their budget request two years 
prior to the exercise.  Since each exercise has a macro-
schedule covering five years, the budget submitted for each 
exercise occurs halfway during the five-year schedule 
otherwise known as Y+250.   Of the five years covered in the 
scheduling of an exercise, the third or budget-year is the 
key year of concern for the five-year schedule. 
 Departments and agencies must be able to develop and 
submit budgets for the exercise program planned for two 
years out.  The exercise descriptions and requirements for 
budget-year exercises must be detailed enough to permit 
this. Therefore, organizations must include descriptions 
for budget-year exercises which include the theme (e.g., 
terrorism or catastrophic natural disaster), goals 
(including the strategic priorities to be addressed), 
tentative objectives, estimated projected costs, and the 
scenario hazard or threat.51  However, these budgets do not 
                     
48 National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, 18. 
49 The President's Management Agenda is an initiative to make the 
U.S. federal government more efficient and effective. Reviews examine 
five areas: human capital, financial accountability, competitive 
sourcing, e-government, and budget and performance integration. 
Agencies and Departments are scored each quarter by the Office of 
Management and Budget (and the Office of Personnel Management for Human 
Capital). Scoring is a on red-yellow-green stoplight 
depiction.(Reference – Wikipedia-
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President%27s_management_agenda)(accessed 
October 10, 2007) 
50 The five-year schedule is broken down as follows:  Y-Year is the 
year the exercise is executed; Y+1 is the Planned Execution Year; Y+2 
is the Budget Year; Y+3 is the Out-year 1; and Y+4 is Out-year 2. 
51 National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, 4. 
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require the submitting organization to specify its level of 
participation in the exercise. 
F.   CURRENT WEAKNESSES AND CHALLENGES 
The NEP IMPLAN provides a foundation for conducting 
the National Exercise Program.  Although it does provide 
the necessary foundation for methodology and guidance, it 
still falls short in some areas concerning interagency 
participation. 
1. Levels of Participation 
Having the correct level of participation by members 
of Departments and Agencies is extremely important.  The 
correct level of participation ensures adequacy and 
representation by employees from that organization.  
Federal organizations should base their level of 
participation on the scenarios developed within the 
exercise and the need and scope of involvement required of 
the department or agency.  Although the NEP IMPLAN requires 
Federal Departments and Agencies to participate in Tier I 
and II exercises, it does not stipulate the required level 
of participation for that agency.  If exercise planners 
develop scenarios and exercise objectives two to three 
years from execution and federal resource managers submit 
budget requests to support participation two years from 
executions, it makes sense that departments and agencies 
must determine their level of participation at least two 
years from execution.  The NEP Executive Steering Committee 
(ESC) must then validate their stated level of 
participation.  This will ensure that budgets submitted  
support levels of participation which in turn supports the 
scenarios and strategic objectives developed for the 
exercise. 
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In addition to participating at the correct levels, 
organizations must maintain these levels throughout the 
exercise.  It becomes problematic when organizations change 
their level of participation while the exercise is ongoing.  
As Pino points out, “The fact that you don’t have 
principals or operations centers that play during the 
course of an exercise, and you have to flip-flop back and 
forth between a real operations center and replicating it 
in a simulations cell or response cell causes a great 
amount of disconnect in the exercise design and the 
exercise.”52 This “disconnect” is important since exercise 
players have to change who they coordinate with while in 
the middle of an exercise.  Phone numbers change, people 
change, levels of knowledge all change, resulting in a 
fragmented scenario and exercise.  Thus, the quality and 
realism of the exercise decreases. 
2. Adequate Funding 
One significant challenge still ongoing is the current 
lack of funding for interagency participation.  As stated 
previously, departments and agencies are now required to 
participate in National-level Exercises and submit budget 
requirements two years prior to execution of the NLE.  
However, the first budget submission will not occur until 
2008 for exercises in 2010.  Therefore, funding for 
interagency participation still must come from within their 
existing budgets. If an organization’s budget cannot 
support a required level of participation, it could 
significantly affect an exercise.  Until funding is 
allocated through the budget process, funds should be  
                     
52 Pino Interview, Colorado Springs, CO, March 2, 2007. 
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provided either through migrating funds from existing 
programs or requesting a congressional supplemental for 
exercise funding. 
G. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended that Federal departments and 
agencies participating in national level exercises identify 
their level of participation at least two years prior to 
execution.  These levels of participation must align with 
the established scenarios and strategic objectives and be 
reflected in the budget submitted for that exercise.  
Departments and Agencies must ensure their actual 
operations centers participate in National-level Exercise.  
Additionally, Federal departments and agencies 
participating in national level exercises must include all 
requirements pertaining to their participation in their 
budget submissions.  These include, but are not limited to, 
personnel costs and travel costs associated with planning, 
executing and post-exercise activities of an NLE. Finally, 
until exercise funds are provided through the budget 
process, funding to support interagency participation must 
be provided either through pre-programming existing funds 
or passing a congressional supplemental. 
H. SUMMARY 
Achieving interagency participation during national-
level exercises is vitally important for fully testing our 
federal government leaders, staffs, and policies.  The need 
to exercise and train on national response actions 
involving our Federal Departments and Agencies is crucial 
in building a readiness posture capable of projecting a 
synchronized federal response during an operation requiring 
federal assistance.  Since TOPOFF 1, follow-on national 
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exercises have clearly shown the need for interagency 
participation.  In April 2007, DHS published the National 
Exercise Program Implementation Plan (NEP IMPLAN).  
Although NEP IMPLAN provides the necessary foundation for 
methodology and guidance, it still falls short in some 
areas concerning interagency participation. 
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III. STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Stability and predictability in planning and executing 
national-level exercises are both critical for securing 
resources and funding plus getting federal and State 
agencies to commit to participating.53  Many different 
factors contribute to a stable and predictable environment 
for planning and executing national-level exercises.  Some 
of the more important factors include identifying federal-
level participation, locking-in exercise dates, and 
identifying scenarios.  These items are critical for 
scenario development and synchronization, funding and 
resources requirements, and observer/controller 
requirements.  Stability and predictability is lacking 
within NEP exercises which then affects all other aspects 
of resourcing, scheduling, and execution of these large, 
full-scale, multi-echelon exercises. 
Historically, stability and predictability in planning 
and coordinating national-level exercises has always been 
problematic for planners to achieve.  Until the President 
formally approved the National Exercise Program early in 
2007, there was no established process for planning at the 
national level.  As such, long-term planning policies and 
tools did not exist for exercise planners to properly 
develop, coordinate, and synchronize national exercises.  
And even though the DHS has an approved National Exercise 
Program, achieving stability and predictability will still 
be hard to achieve. 
                     
53 NORAD-USNORTHCOM Exercise Issues. 
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B. DEFINING STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY 
In order to fully identify the major issues concerning 
stability and predictability, it becomes necessary to 
provide functional definitions for these two terms as they 
apply to National-level exercises.  For the purposes of 
this paper, predictability pertains to long-term (more than 
one year) aspects of scheduling and systemic planning of 
National-level Exercises.  Developing a long-term exercise 
schedule, to include venues and participants, is an example 
of predictability.  The EP achieves stability by 
eliminating unnecessary or unneeded changes to the exercise 
plan(s) and adhering to timelines, resources, and 
scenarios, as well as synchronizing activities and events 
involved in a National-level exercise.   Stability and 
predictability are extremely important to both exercise 
planners and participants.  Stability and predictability 
allows planners to better develop better exercises because 
the scenarios have been identified, the resources 
allocated, and participants selected.  Likewise, stability 
and predictability provides an expectation with 
participants from Federal organizations of future training, 
budget developments and personnel commitments.  As such, 
stability and predictability are essential for securing 
exercise resources and funding plus getting federal and 
State agencies to commit to participating in these 
exercises.54   
C. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING PREDICTABILITY AND STABILITY 
Planning national level exercises is a long and 
complex process involving many participants, resources and 
time.  Many different factors contribute to a stable and 
                     
54 NORAD-USNORTHCOM Exercise Issues. 
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predictable environment for planning and executing 
national-level exercises.  Some of the most important and 
basic factors necessary to achieve predictability and 
stability include identifying exercise participants, 
identifying and locking-in exercise dates, and establishing 
exercise scenarios.   
1. Identifying Participants 
In past exercises, exercise planner identified players 
from federal organizations to participate based on the type 
of event or disaster occurring in the exercise and the 
normal functional role played in responding to the specific 
type of incident.  For example, a hurricane scenario would 
have significant participation by FEMA.  A biological event 
would normally have extensive participation by the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  A nuclear or 
radiological event would have large participation by 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).  For state and 
local participants, selection to play in National-level 
exercises depended on their ability to commit the time and 
resources in planning and executing the events.  In some 
cases, states may already be planning readiness exercises 
with local municipalities.  Federal organizations55 then 
solicit these states to participate in an NLE.  Some 
problems associated with this method are that some states 
may not give a commitment to participate until well into 
the planning cycle.  
Identifying exercise participants and their level of 
organizational participation as early as possible in the 
planning process is necessary.  These two items are vital 
                     
55 Usually FEMA or DHS invited state and local participants. 
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for developing and synchronizing scenarios, identifying 
funding and resources requirements, and defining and 
resourcing observer/controller requirements.  One past 
example of how these items affected stability and 
predictability occurred during the year-long planning 
process for TOPOFF 3 in 2005.  During this exercise, 
several Federal-level exercise participants did not 
determine their roles or levels of participation until just 
a few months before the exercise. These delays placed 
additional stress on the planning process for the exercise.  
Eventually, these participants determined their exercise 
roles and levels of participation, requiring DHS to 
seamlessly integrate these participants into the exercise 
within a few weeks before the start of the exercise.  The 
efforts required to integrate these last minute agencies 
included one-on-one meetings and mobile training teams.56   
2. Locking-in Exercise Dates 
Locking-in exercise dates is yet another factor 
affecting stability and predictability.  Exercise planners 
try to identify exercise dates three to five years prior to 
execution.  They then attempt to lock in these dates two 
years out from execution of the exercise.  However, locking 
in exercise dates can prove challenging.  Such was the case 
with Vigilant Shield 07, a DOD exercise focusing on 
Homeland Defense.  In July 2006, DOD officials decided to 
move the exercise one month from November 2006 to December 
2006.  The reason OSD gave for moving the exercise dates 
was to deflect visibility of the exercise while mid-term 
                     
56 Skinner, Review, 14. 
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elections were taking place.57  The impact of this change 
required significant logistical and operational changes to 
the exercise plus schedule changes of exercise 
participants.  This required exercise planners to go back, 
re-coordinate, and re-synchronize resources, participants, 
and operational forces.58   
3. Establishing Exercise Scenarios 
Another item contributing to stability and 
predictability in National-level exercises is identifying 
and locking-in scenarios as early as possible.  Normally, 
exercise planners identify scenarios during the exercise 
Concept Working Group conference, which usually occurs 
thirteen to fourteen months from exercise execution.  
During the Concept Working Group, scenarios are refined 
with a basic overall concept plus resource and force 
requirements.  The building of scenarios commences from 
that point with further coordination occurring during the 
initial and mid-planning conferences.  This was the process 
for exercise planning and scenario development for Exercise 
Ardent Sentry 2006 scheduled for execution May 4-18, 2006.  
Approximately four weeks prior to execution of the 
exercise, DHS decided to add a hurricane scenario to the 
onset of the exercise.  Injecting this scenario so close to 
the execution of the exercise resulted in significant 
coordination and synchronization efforts between NORAD-
USNORTHCOM staff, the Joint Staff, and both DHS and FEMA 
headquarters.  Exercise planners conducted meetings, video-
teleconferences and conference telephone calls daily to 
                     
57 This information was common knowledge among exercise planners at 
HQ NORAD-USNORTHCOM. 
58 NORAD-USNORTHCOM Exercise Issues. 
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ensure this new scenario, built as a replica of Hurricane 
Katrina, was properly developed and synchronized by all 
organizations at all levels.  Not only was this a 
significant undertaking, but it took time away from 
exercise planners to complete and refine planning 
requirements for the other four scenarios occurring in the 
exercise.59  Sometimes, late additions or changes to 
scenarios are necessary due to new requirements or changes 
to normal business practices.  In these cases, exercise 
planners must change the plan and incorporate the changes.  
However, it should only occur when absolutely necessary.   
D.   CURRENT CONSTRUCT – EXERCISE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
With the implementation of the National Exercise 
Program early in 2007, DHS has developed an exercise 
planning process called “Exercise Program Management”.60 
According to DHS, Exercise Program Management is “...a 
collaborative approach that integrates the different 
resources of various agencies, organizations, and 
individuals from both the public and private sectors. 
Exercise program management is directed toward achieving 
the objectives established during the multi-year planning 
process, as described in an entity’s Multi-Year Training 
and Exercise Plan.”61 
Conducting an exercise involves comprehensive 
coordination among participating multiple agencies and 
officials. The Exercise Program Management process divides 
individual exercises into five overarching phases: 
                     
59 NORAD-USNORTHCOM Exercise Issues. 
60 HSEEP Volume 1, 13. 
61 HSEEP Volume 1, 5. 
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Foundation, Design and Development, Conduct, Evaluation, 
and Improvement Planning.62  These phases are depicted in 
Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2.  Exercise Program Management63 
 
Of the five phases in Exercise Program Management, an 
exercise achieves a stable and predictable environment 
through planning actions occurring during the Foundation 
Phase and Design and Development phase.  The Four-year 
 
 
                     
62 National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, 7. 
63 From Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise 
and Evaluation Program, Volume 1: HSEEP Overview and Exercise Program 
Management (Washington D.C.: February 2007), 8. 
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Strategic Exercise Cycle and the Five-year Exercise 
Planning Schedule are the two key products resulting from 
this planning process.   
These phases are very similar to the phases used by 
DOD in developing military exercises.  The Joint Event Life 
Cycle (JELC) also has five distinct phases:  Phase 1 – 
Design; Phase 2 – Planning; Phase 3 – Preparation; Phase 4 
– Execution; and Phase 5 – Evaluation.64  The scope and 
complexity of the training event determine the length of 
time to complete the JELC. For training events utilizing a 
full-scale exercise for broader training audiences at 
multiple echelons such as combatant command, the JELC may 
span a period of many months and sometimes as much as 12 to 
18 months for a major joint exercise.65  The figure below 
depicts an example of a JELC for one of these types of 
exercises. 
                     
64 CJCS Guide 3501G, The Joint Training System :  A Primer for Senior 
Leaders, (Washington D.C.: 2006), 28, 
http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/g3501.pdf (accessed 
February 29, 2008). 
65 Ibid., 28-29. 
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Figure 3.  Joint Event Life Cycle66 
 
E. FOUR-YEAR STRATEGIC EXERCISE CYCLE 
In order to institute a level of stability into its 
National Exercise Program, DHS’ National Exercise Division 
has established a 4-year strategic exercise cycle based on 
Presidential elections.67  Table 2 depicts this four-year 











                     
66 From Slide 11, NORAD-USNORTHCOM, Joint Training and Exercise 
Planning Group, (Colorado Springs, CO:  2006), 11 (accessed February 
29, 2008). 
67 National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, 7. 
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Basic Theme Timeframe in Cycle 
Transition Training 
Program - Multiple Themes 
New Presidential Administration 
(i.e., Incoming 2009) 
Domestic Incident: Non-
Terrorism 








4th Year of Pres. Administration 
(i.e., 2012) 
Table 2.   Four-Year Exercise Cycle68 
 
This four-year “Presidential” exercise cycle, is a 
progressive training methodology intended to add rigor to 
succeeding National exercises.  The year a president is 
installed into office, the new administration undergoes a 
Transition Training Program.69  This transition training 
culminates in a capstone Functional Exercise, which serves 
as an immersive experience for the senior officials.70  
Following the Transition Training program, the themes 
depicted in Table 2, above, provide the basis for exercises 
conducted in the remaining three follow-on years. 
F. FIVE YEAR EXERCISE PLANNING SCHEDULE 
In addition to the four-year “Presidential” cycle, DHS 
has also established an exercise-planning schedule which 
coordinates actions from the current exercise year to four 
years out.  The following table identifies these years and 
their descriptions: 
                     
68 Eugenio Pino, National Exercise Program Update, (Colorado Springs, 
CO: 2007), 5. 




Identified Year Planning Requirements 
Current- Year (Y) 
(i.e., 2008) 
 
No changes are permitted to the current-
year schedule.  Final planning and 




Any adjustments based on requirements 





Departments and Agencies submit budgets 
for the exercise program planned for this 
year.  Budget information must include 
(at minimum) the theme, goals/strategic 
priorities, tentative objectives, 
estimated projected costs, scenario 
threat, and the levels of participation 




Refine exercise theme, hazard, and 
tentative priority interagency objectives 
and the scenario hazard or threat. 
Outyear-Two (Y+4) 
(i.e., 2012) 
Identify theme, goals, tentative 
objectives, and the scenario threat. 
Table 3.   Five Year Schedule71 
 
These two planning tools, the four-year exercise cycle 
and the five-year planning cycle provide predictability and 
stability.  The long-term planning requirements derived 
from both the four-year “presidential cycle” and the five-
year exercise schedule provide predictability.  Stability 
is provided by “locking-in” exercise requirements within 
                     
71 National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, 3-4. 
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twelve months from exercise execution and eliminating 
unnecessary or capricious changes. 
G.  ANNUAL EXERCISING PROGRAMMING PROCESS 
In order to develop and review exercises the year 
prior to execution, DHS uses their newly developed Annual 
Exercising Programming Process.  This process provides a 
timeline and systematic means for developing and achieving 
requirements necessary for Tier I through IV exercises. The 
table below depicts the basic elements and their timelines. 
 
Month NEP Annual Programming Process Action  
July Budget Call 
August Strategic Review (Threat/Vulnerability/CAP) 
September DRAFT NEP Annual Planning Guidance 
October Petitions for Near-term Schedule Changes.   
December Exercise Proposals due 
January NEP Exercise Scheduling Conference 
February Budget Transmission to Congress 
March Draft five-year Schedule 
May NLE conducted 
June Five-year Schedule Approved 
Table 4.   Annual Exercising Programming Process72 
 
                     
72 After Table 2, Summary Annual NEP Timeline, National Exercise 
Program Implementation Plan, 9-10. 
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Of all the actions listed above, the NEP Exercise 
Scheduling Conference occurring in January of each year is 
critical since exercises, exercise dates, and participant 
conflicts are resolved.   
H. CURRENT CHALLENGES 
As previously stated, DHS has established a four-year 
cycle based on national elections plus a five-year exercise 
planning schedule.  However, these established processes do 
not necessarily guarantee stability and predictability in 
national exercises.  National leaders must implement 
additional actions and/or processes in order to establish a 
stable and predictive environment for planning National-
level Exercises.  Some important actions include 
establishing priorities, providing funding, and “spreading 
the wealth” to maximize exercise participation and 
effectiveness. 
1. Establishing Priorities 
Establishing priorities for scenarios and training 
objectives for exercises is an extremely important element 
for national exercises.  However, establishing those 
priorities is not always easy.  Departments and Agencies 
have their own priorities for exercise scenarios and 
objectives.  According to Mr. William McNally, Director of 
DHS’ National Exercise Department, “Everybody’s got their 
own priorities about what’s the most important.  That in 
itself is a problem and that’s one we struggle with.”73  
This creates a disjointed approach when trying to establish 
the five year planning schedule since departments and 
                     
73 McNally Interview, Colorado Springs, CO, September 13, 2007. 
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agencies are likely to believe that their priorities are 
the most important during Tier I and II exercises.   
It seems evident that priorities for exercises should 
come from past exercises, actual events, or guidance from 
national leaders such as Congress or the President.  The 
four-year cycle provides a theme for an exercise but no 
detailed scenarios or objectives.  Likewise, the 5-year 
strategic plan calls for identifying scenarios and 
objectives, but without guidance from national leaders, 
deciding on scenarios and national objectives is 
problematic.  According to McNally, “We’re asking under the 
NEP that we get that direction from senior authorities.  We 
need to understand the vulnerabilities to our national 
infrastructure.  What are the gaps?  We need to get the 
White House to tell us these [issues] are our priorities.  
These are the key issues for us right now.  And that 
[guidance] we want to lay out into our five year 
[strategic] schedule.”74  Therefore, getting guidance from 
our national leaders for priorities on scenarios and 
objectives is an important element the five-year strategic 
schedule must incorporate. 
2. Proper Funding 
Although funding will discussed in detail in the next 
chapter, it certainly bears further discussion as it 
pertains to stability and predictability.  Funding is an 
important resource for providing stability and 
predictability in national exercises because it is tied 
directly to establishing the Five-year Exercise Schedule.  
It allows getting advance commitments for participants, 
                     
74 McNally Interview, Colorado Springs, CO, September 13, 2007. 
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transportation, and exercise resources.  Without funding 
identified at least two years prior to the execution for 
that particular exercise, the planning and exercise 
expectation grinds to a halt.  As Mr. McNally points out, 
“Funding would help us get the national [five-year] 
exercise schedule aligned.”75  Unfortunately, lack of 
funding hinders planning for exercises and locking in 
participation well before execution of exercises.   
3. Spreading the Wealth 
Spreading the wealth involves ensuring all departments 
and agencies are exercised and not just a select few.  
Exercises should be planned and scenarios developed to 
incorporate as many Federal Departments and Agencies as 
possible.  This ensures that these departments and agencies 
achieve a higher level of preparedness, which in turn 
ensures they are ready to respond when called upon.  In 
addition, it creates a more realistic exercise since, as 
the federal response to Hurricane Katrina showed the 
nation, a catastrophic event of that magnitude would most 
certainly involve all Departments and Agencies.   
Another perspective of spreading the wealth is to 
spread it geographically.  For example, hurricane 
preparedness exercises should not be limited to the Gulf 
Coast region nor should scenarios involving terrorist 
activities only occur in New York or the National Capital 
Region.  Spreading the wealth geographically ensures all 
federal, state and local entities will likely get a chance 
in participating in the full-scale national exercises.  It 
will also prevent “exercise burnout” from occurring by 
                     
75 McNally Interview, Colorado Springs, CO, September 13, 2007. 
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exercising the same regions over and over.  Finally, it 
allows the Federal Government to fully exercise plans and 
policies horizontally with other federal organizations and 
vertically with state and local entities.  
I.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order for National-level exercises to be effective, 
DHS must incorporate changes into the current construct of 
the National Exercise Program.  One key change is for 
National leaders to establish priorities for exercising 
scenarios and identifying national objectives.  In 
addition, Congress must provide adequate funding to federal 
organizations in order to ensure their full participation 
in national exercises.  Furthermore, exercises must be 
developed, planned and executed to include equitable 
participation across Departments and Agencies and 
vertically to include state and local entities.  Finally, 
organizations must conduct NLEs across geographic regions 
to meet the vertical and horizontal challenges. 
J. SUMMARY 
Stability and predictability in planning and executing 
national-level exercises are crucial for securing exercise 
resources and funding plus getting federal and State 
agencies to commit to participating in these exercises.  
Many different factors contribute to a stable and 
predictable environment for planning and executing 
national-level exercises.  Some of the most important 
factors include identifying federal-level participation, 
locking-in exercise dates, and identifying scenarios.  The 
four-year strategic cycle and the five-year planning 
schedule are two planning methodologies recently instituted 
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by DHS which should help provide stability and 
predictability in National-level Exercises.   
 50
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IV.  FUNDING NATIONAL LEVEL EXERCISES 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Exercises are the primary tool used by the federal 
government for evaluating its capability to perform in a 
crisis or emergency.  National Level Exercises (NLE) 
involves many organizations at the Federal, State, and 
local levels to execute and validate current plans and 
policies pertinent to preventing or responding to man-made 
or natural disasters.  The financial and human resources 
necessary to plan, execute and assess a national-level 
exercise are immense.  One significant challenge of 
National Level Exercises is the availability of federal 
funding to facilitate participation by exercise players, 
planners, and support staff with requirements throughout 
the lifecycle of each exercise. Without sufficient funding, 
organizations have few options regarding the ability to 
fund their participation in large, full-scale exercises.  
Some of these options include using funds from current 
operational budgets or providing minimum support or 
participation during large exercises.  However, either 
option may be problematic if the department or agency 
participation requirements are substantial.   
B.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
As has been stated previously in this document, 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive #8 (HSPD-8) 
directed the Department of Homeland Security to establish a 
National Exercise Program and also directed Federal 
Departments and Agencies to participate in the process of 
designating national-level exercises and state their level 
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of participation in those exercises.76  However, there was 
no stipulation in HSPD-8 that Federal Departments and 
Agencies actually participate in these exercises nor did it 
mandate Congress provide funding to facilitate Federal 
Department and Agency participation in these large, full-
scale exercises.  As a result, achieving full interagency 
participation during past national-level exercises has not 
occurred.  This is considering Federal Departments and 
Agencies have not budgeted or received funding for their 
participation.     
This need for interagency participation certainly 
became apparent during the federal response to Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005. The Whitehouse Report, The Federal 
Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, identified 
Federal interagency coordination as a significant issue 
during relief efforts. The report further indicated that 
Federal officials lacked a fundamental understanding of the 
National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS).77   This lack of understanding in 
both the NRP and NIMS was a result of insufficient 
interagency training which Department and Agency 
participation in NLE exercises would rectify.78  This leads 
back to a lack of funding for these Departments and 
Agencies to facilitate their participation. Unfortunately, 
the Katrina Lessons Learned did not identify problems with 
interagency exercise participation or a lack of funding 
 
                     
76 HSPD-8. 
77 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:  Lessons Learned, 13. 
78 Ibid., 73. 
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which facilitates their participation in NLEs and thus 
improve integration and response capabilities of all 
response providers. 
C.   THE NATIONAL EXERCISE PROGRAM 
The NEP IMPLAN establishes a framework for the 
National Exercise Program (NEP), including overall 
guidance, roles and responsibilities, timelines, and 
objectives.  As stated previously in Chapter II, the NEP 
categorizes exercises into four separate tiers which 
reflect the relative priority for interagency 
participation, with Tier I as the highest and Tier IV as 
the lowest.79 Although the NEP IMPLAN provides this 
information in significant detail, it provides very little 
information or guidance in terms of federal Department or 
Agency funding to support their participation in NLEs.  It 
does state, however, that, “All Departments and Agencies 
shall budget for support to NEP Tier I exercises…”.80 This 
implies that no other funding is available to federal 
Departments and Agencies for their participation in NLEs.  
Therefore, two budget aspects tie the ability of a federal 
Department or Agency to participate in an NLE:  (1) 
Submitting a budget request forecasting their funding 
requirements for participation in an NLE, and, (2) 
Receiving the actual amounts budgeted for that year.  Mr. 
Pino, Director of Training and Exercise at United States 
Northern Command identified the impact funding has on 
interagency participation in National Level Exercises.  
According to Pino, “Here’s the bottom line.  The National 
Exercise Program will, in my opinion, will become a paper  
                     
79 National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, 4. 
80 Ibid., 16. 
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tiger… if the Departments and Agencies we require to 
participate do not have a funding line associated with the 
National Exercise Program.”81 
D. FIVE YEAR PLAN 
As pointed out in chapter III of this document, DHS 
has developed, in coordination with the heads of other 
relevant departments and agencies,  a five-year schedule of 
exercises in order to systematically layout the macro-level 
planning for exercises.  This schedule is coordinated with 
the Departments and Agencies, processed, and approved the 
Homeland Security Council (HSC) and National Security 
Council (NSC).82 The schedule includes an appendix with 
summary descriptions of the scheduled Tier I and Tier II 
exercises.  Based on this five-year schedule, the first 
time a department or agency could actually expect to see 
funds, based on a budget submission in 2008, is 2010 and 
more likely, 2011.  That is if DHS and exercise planners 
have developed adequate exercise information that far in 
advance in which to submit the budget request.  
Additionally, even if these budgets are submitted, there is 
no guarantee that federal funds allocated will be 
sufficient to allow adequate federal organization 
participation in exercises.  This puts the actual exercise 
at risk since important Federal-level players are unable to 
participate.  Therefore, the importance of funding these 
exercises has a direct impact on effectiveness of our 
National Exercise Program and, in turn, the preparedness of 
our nation to respond to natural or man-made disaster 
events.   
                     
81 Pino Interview, Colorado Springs, CO, June 15, 2007. 
82 National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, 4. 
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E.  NEP BUDGET OVERVIEW 
DHS provides funding for exercises through two 
different programs, the National Exercise Program (NEP) and 
the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP).  The NEP focus is to train national leaders and 
Departmental and Agency staff, plus facilitate 
collaboration among partners at all levels of government 
for assigned homeland security missions. HSEEP provides the 
governing doctrine and policy which all DHS funded 
exercises are designed, developed, conducted, and 
evaluated.83  
DHS’ National Exercise Program budget for 2008 is 
fifty million dollars.  This is about the same amount in 
past years.  Table 5 below shows the National Exercise 
Program budget for the current and previous three years: 
 
Fiscal 
Year 2008 2007 2006 2005 
$ in 
Millions 50 48 59 52 
Table 5.   National Exercise Funding, FY 2005-200884,85 
 
Of the amount shown above, approximately 30% of the 
funds support requirements (i.e., planning and logistics) 
for Top Officials (TOPOFF) exercises and approximately 50% 
                     
83 HSEEP, Volume 1, 7. 
84 Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 
Preparedness, FY 2006 Program Budget Review, (Washington D.C.: 
Department of Homeland Security), 8 (accessed December 27, 2007). 
85 National Emergency Management Association, Preliminary Analysis of 
the Budget for Fiscal Year 2008 For the Department of Homeland 
Security, 4, http://www.nemaweb.org/?1811 (accessed September 25, 
2007). 
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funds state-level exercise support requirements.  The 
remainder of the funding is for specialized exercises.86 
DHS’ HSEEP provides some funding to states and local 
jurisdictions through the grant program to support 
participation in exercises.   States receive an annual 
allocation of grant funds from DHS and may use a portion of 
these funds to enhance their State and local prevention and 
response capabilities through terrorism exercises. State 
participants must use these grant funds in accordance with 
the State Homeland Security Strategy.  States can also 
combine grant funds with funds from other agencies to 
support a single exercise or set of exercises.87  The 
exercise funding obtained through the DHS Grants Program 
provides staffing and exercise support to state and local 
Agencies involved in exercises.88  This type of funding 
support is important for securing participation from states 
and local jurisdictions in all types of exercises. 
Although DHS provides funding to states and their 
subordinate jurisdictions, there has been no dedicated or 
formalized funding program for Federal Departments and 
Agencies.  Mr. Pino further explains the issue:  “The grant 
program goes down [to the states]. It doesn’t go to either 
Department and Agencies so those other Departments and 
Agencies still have to come up with their own money to 
                     
86 FY 2006 Program Budget Review, 8. 
87 HSEEP, Volume 1, A-1. 
88 Department of Homeland Security, Exercises and Training and 
Exercise Plan Workshops: Direct Support Applications and Users’ 
Handbook (Washington D.C.: October 2006), 7-9, 
http://www.state.il.us/iema/training/Exercises/ExerciseDownloads/Applic
ation_for_Exercise_Funding.doc(accessed November 26, 2007). 
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participate in exercises.”89  Therefore, in order for 
federal organizations to participate in these large-scale 
exercises, they must use existing funds from within their 
organizations.  Because of this, participation in national 
level exercises by federal level organizations is extremely 
limited.  No definitive funding stream or guidance 
exacerbates the problem of federal interagency 
participation in NLEs.  Use of funds from a Department’s or 
Agency’s operating budget constrains participation in 
exercises.  Without centralized or dedicated funding 
support, federal organizations have had to rely upon the 
“health” of their Department or Agency’s budget.  If their 
budget is unable to support a required level of 
participation, it would likely curtail their participation 
which could significantly impact an exercise, such as it 
has for NLE 2-08, scheduled to occur in May 2008.  In this 
exercise, FEMA is providing a simulated Joint Field Office 
(JFO) instead establishing a fully manned and functional 
JFO due to funding constraints.  As Pino points out, “There 
has to be more than just the grant program if we’re really 
going to make the National Exercise Program successful.”90 
F.   EXERCISE FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS 
Funding budgeted and allocated for National Level 
Exercises must address exercise requirements from a 
holistic perspective and must not be limited to just the 
execution portion of national level exercises.  Although 
the execution portion is the largest activity of any 
exercise, the planning portion and assessment portion are 
                     
89 Pino Interview, Colorado Springs, CO, June 15, 2007. 
90 Pino Interview, Colorado Springs, CO, June 15, 2007. 
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also important phases.  Significant planning must occur 
prior to the execution of exercises in order to properly 
coordinate and synchronize the myriad of tasks and 
interactions between public and private organizations at 
all levels.  Much of the planning occurs through the 
various conferences held throughout the planning lifecycle 
for each exercise and involves travel and personnel costs 
for hundreds of participants.  Following an exercise, 
organizations are still involved with tasking, 
synchronizing, and implementing the corrective actions 
identified during the exercise, as well as attending after-
action conferences specifically for the exercise.  Although 
this is a smaller effort than the planning or execution 
portions of the exercise lifecycle, it is a vitally 
important effort since federal, state and local 
organizations base future policy and legislative decisions 
on these corrective actions.  In addition, organizations 
must fund extra training required in preparation for NLEs, 
especially if the training is important for the success of 
the exercise. 
As pointed out in Chapter II of this document, Federal 
Departments and Agencies must provide budget information 
for NLEs.  Although the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) is responsible for reviewing budget submissions to 
ensure they address NEP requirements, this is mostly for 
ensuring support for the President’s Management Agenda.91  
As such, no federal committee or organization has the 
specific responsibility for ensuring that budget 
submissions by Federal Departments and Agencies adequately 
                     
91 National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, 4. 
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meet operational requirements for planning, executing and 
assessing national level exercises.  Therefore, a large 
void remains for ensuring Federal organizations have 
adequate funding for their participation in NLEs.   
Additionally, Department of Defense has a myriad of 
exercises outside the NLEs with a committed goal to 
integrate their operations with other Federal Departments 
and Agencies.  Therefore, DOD places many requests on these 
federal organizations to participate in these DOD-centric 
exercises.  Unfortunately, these Departments and Agencies 
woefully lack the resources, in both funding and manpower, 
to meet DOD exercise participation needs.  According to 
Pino, “The reality is,... if every single COCOM (Combatant 
Commander) is telling the Department that interagency 
integrated operations is their number one priority,... then 
we have to realize that they can’t fund and they can’t 
participate at the levels we want them to because of these 
fiscal constraints.”92  Pino proposes that DOD should be 
able to pay personnel and travel costs in order to get 
other federal organization representation.  As Pino points 
out, “We don’t have any problems paying a contractor DOD 
money to put a table-top [exercise] together.  But we have 
policy restrictions on doing the same thing and taking 
[DOD] money and getting people [from other Departments and 
Agencies] who know their stuff to participate in our 
exercises.  It’s absolutely crazy.”  Pino goes on to 
recommend that policy or legislative actions must take 
place to allow for this cross-department funding. 
                     




In order to ensure federal departments and agencies 
receive adequate funding for their participation in NLEs, 
responsible parties must implement the following three 
recommendations:  First, Federal Departments and Agencies 
participating in national level exercises must include all 
requirements pertaining to their participation in their 
budget submissions.  These include, but are not limited to, 
personnel costs and travel costs associated with planning, 
executing and post-exercise activities of an NLE.  Second 
Federal Departments and Agencies participating in national 
level exercises must submit their budgets IAW budgeting 
procedures.  In addition, an executive-level committee, 
such as the Homeland Security Counsel, must review budget 
submissions to ensure they meet exercise participation 
requirements before, during, and after an NLE.  Finally, 
Department and Agency leaders must make policy changes to 
allow for cross-department funding of personnel to 
participate in exercises.  This will ensure those 
Departments and Agencies requiring personnel from other 
Federal organization provide adequate funding for their 
participation.  
H. SUMMARY 
In order to exercise the full extent of Federal 
Department and Agency participation during NLEs, a formal 
funding process must be identified and implemented.  As a 
minimum, this funding process must include all exercise 
requirements, it must have sufficient oversight from an 
executive-level committee, and it must include other policy 
changes which allow cross-department or agency funding.  
The preparedness of our government is directly tied to 
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federal participation in NLEs which, in turn, is directly 
tied to adequate funding for federal partners to 
participate. The importance of funding these exercises has 
a direct impact on effectiveness of the NEP and the 
preparedness of our nation to respond to natural or man-
made disaster events.   
 62
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V. CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A significant shortfall affecting the preparedness of 
our nation is the lack of a remedial program for 
identifying issues, making assignments to resolve the 
issues, and tracking progress towards resolving and 
implementing those resolutions.93  As such, there has been 
no formal system in place to systematically identify and 
improve deficiencies or shortcomings occurring during 
national events, such as Hurricane Katrina or exercises, 
such as TOPOFF.  Furthermore, many of the same deficiencies 
keep occurring during exercises and real world events. 
Remedial or corrective action programs are extremely 
important mechanisms within organizations for identifying, 
analyzing, and addressing deficiencies and shortcomings 
identified during exercises, policy discussions, and real-
world events.  They provide a means for improving practices 
and procedures occurring within an organization, as well as 
across multiple organizations.  DHS has recently unveiled a 
corrective action program (CAP) intended to develop, 
prioritize, track and analyze corrective actions identified 
from events and exercises.  Prior to the implementation of 
the DHS CAP, there was no national-level remedial system in 




                     
93 National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, 3. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
1. Lessons Learned Information System 
As stated in Chapter I, HSPD-8 directed DHS “… to 
collect, analyze, and disseminate lessons learned, best 
practices, and information from exercises, training events, 
research, and other sources, including actual incidents, 
and establish procedures to improve national preparedness 
to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events.”94  
DHS did this by establishing its Lessons Learned 
Information System (LLIS).  LLIS is a repository of lessons 
learned collected from federal, state and local departments 
and agencies across the country.  LLIS.gov is the national 
database of Lessons Learned, best practices, innovative 
ideas, and preparedness information for stakeholders in 
homeland security and emergency response disciplines at the 
federal, state and local levels.  
In addition to being a repository of information, 
LLIS.gov is also a data network intended to allow homeland 
security and emergency response professionals from across 
the country share their knowledge and expertise.  However, 
LLIS.gov is not a remedial program to improve national 
practices and procedures.  It does not include a means to 
actively distribute lessons learned to appropriate 
organizations, for assigning responsibility for resolving 
the lessons identified across departments and agencies, or 
for monitoring the progress of resolving lessons identified 
and implementing those resolutions.95   
                     
94 HSPD-8. 
95 Richard Skinner, Statement before the U.S. Senate, Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington D.C., March 8, 
2006, 19. 
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2. No Past Corrective Action Process 
Until the first few months of 2007, there was no over- 
arching CAP program at the National-level even though some 
federal departments and agencies did have internal 
corrective action processes.  Procedures for DHS, or any 
other government organization, to track, resolve, and 
implement lessons learned from past exercises (and other 
events) across government organizations were not in place. 
This resulted in many incorrect actions and bad or poor 
practices occurring during exercises and real incidents to 
go uncorrected.   As a result, many of these shortfalls 
resurfaced during later events and exercise participants 
repeated the same incorrect actions. 
During the After-Action Conference or “hot-wash” 
immediately following TOPOFF 3, participants said the same 
issues identified in previous exercises reoccurred during 
TOPOFF 3.  One of these reoccurrences was amending the 
definition of a major disaster in the Stafford Act to 
include WMD events.  During the TOPOFF 2 exercise, Illinois 
state officials requested federal assistance under the 
Stafford Act but the simulated events in Illinois did not 
qualify as a major disaster because biological disasters 
were not included in the Act, and FEMA interpreted the 
request as ineligible. Although the Stafford Act was 
identified as needing to be amended following TOPOFF 2, no 
action was taken to amend the Act to include biological 
events and FEMA has not changed its interpretation.96,97 
                     
96 Skinner, Review, 30. 
97 To date, the act has still not been amended. 
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In November 2005, the Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) for DHS prepared a review to assess the efforts by 
DHS’ Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 
Preparedness (SLGCP) to develop, plan, coordinate, and 
conduct the Top Officials 3 (TOPOFF 3) exercise.98  The OIG 
report provided fourteen recommendations for implementation 
into future exercises.  Of the fourteen recommendations 
provided, two of the recommendations were resolved and the 
responsible offices in DHS did not even acknowledge or act 
upon the remaining twelve recommendations.  The twelve 
recommendations, therefore, remain unresolved.99  
 Unfortunately, the problem with re-identifying lessons 
learned from previous events was not isolated to just 
exercises.  Many of the Lessons Learned identified in the 
Hurricane Katrina Report were the same Lessons Learned from 
TOPOFF 3 conducted approximately four months earlier:   
The most recent Top Officials (“TOPOFF”) exercise 
in April 2005 revealed the Federal government’s 
lack of progress in addressing a number of 
preparedness deficiencies, many of which 
participants had identified in previous 
exercises. This lack of progress reflects, in 
part, the absence of a remedial action program to 
systematically address lessons learned from 
exercises.100 
C.   CURRENT FEDERAL LEVEL REMEDIAL ACTION PROGRAMS 
1. Department of Defense 
DOD has used Lessons Learned to improve training, 
practices, and procedures found to be substandard through 
internal or external evaluations and observations.  The 
                     
98 Skinner, Review, Preface. 
99 Ibid., 32-38. 
100 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:  Lessons Learned, 76. 
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services document military training exercises and 
operations in after-action reports, which include lessons 
learned information. Units of all sizes have access to this 
information and use it to improve their tactics, techniques 
and procedures (TTPs) to increase their combat readiness 
and effectiveness.  One of the key benefits which services 
and the Joint Staff derive from lessons learned is the 
ability to identify recurring and systemic weaknesses in 
key areas. The services and the Joint Staff can then 
document and publish problem areas and trends, allowing 
others to benefit from these experiences and institute 
corrective actions. According to senior military leaders, 
“weaknesses can be addressed through changes to such areas 
as doctrine, training and education, tactics, leadership, 
and materiel.”101  The Army’s lessons learned program 
established in 1996 has been in existence the longest.102  
All the other services established their own lessons 
learned process after that, as well as the Joint Staff. The 
Joint Staff established the Joint Center for Lessons 
Learned to maintain and manage lessons learned obtained 
from joint military operations and exercises. DOD 
disseminates these lessons learned, which include ways to 
improve practices or overcome problems, among joint 
commands and the services.103 
                     
101 United States General Accounting Office, Military Training:  
Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid Past Mistakes Is Largely 
Untapped, (Washington D.C.: 1995), 10, 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/ns95152.pdf (accessed April 29, 2007). 
102 GAO, Military Training, 11. 
103 GAO, Military Training, 12-13. 
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2.  Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 RAMP – Remedial Action Management Program is FEMA’s 
process for ensuring lessons result in solutions.  This 
program combines the essential components of a lessons 
learned system into an overarching process designed to fix 
lessons identified during national events.  These essential 
or key components include collecting issues from 
“hotwashes” and after-action reviews around the country, 
consolidating issues into a single report, assigning 
responsibility to parties for fixing problems, and 
monitoring the progress of resolving and implementing 
solutions.104 
3. Other Organizations 
Other federal departments and agencies, such as the 
Department of Energy and NASA, have some type of remedial 
program to identify, resolve, track, and disseminate 
lessons within their specific organization.  These programs 
only work internally within their organizations.  There has 
not existed a process or means to assign, resolve, track, 
and implement lessons horizontally across entities or 
vertically between local, state and federal entities.   
D. DHS’ CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM 
 DHS has recently implemented a Corrective Action 
Process called the CAP System.  This system is an internet-
based application intended to allow Federal, State, and 
local officials to develop, prioritize, track, and analyze 
corrective actions following exercises and real-world 
incidents.  As stated on its website, DHS developed the CAP 
System for the purpose of systematically translating 
exercise and real-world outputs — such as findings, 
                     
104 Skinner Statement, 21. 
 69
recommendations, lessons learned, and best practices into 
meaningful inputs for nation-wide homeland security plans, 
programs, and budgets.  The corrective actions processed 
through the CAP System are intended to improve 
organizational practices and procedures, such as NIMS, the 
National Response Plan,105 and various national strategies, 
not to mention existing legislation and policies.  
Accordingly, heads of departments and agencies at the 
federal level, plus state and local officials must be 
involved in reviewing and implementing corrective actions 
affecting their particular organization.   
1. Relationship Between the NEP and CAP 
 As it pertains to the NEP, DHS processes and 
administers unclassified issues through the CAP System.106  
The primary purpose of NEP exercises is to improve 
governmental capabilities pertaining to events requiring 
catastrophic incident management and crisis coordination. 
Therefore, it is important to document the results of all 
NEP events.107  In order for this new system to be truly 
effective, it must go beyond just identifying actions 
requiring improvement.  This process must actively assign 
these actions to organizations for resolution, analyze 
actions for trends, and then disseminate the results to 
organizations so that future deficiencies do not recur.     
                     
105 At the time of this writing the National Response Framework was 
approved effective March 22, 2008, which is sixty days after its 
publication in the Federal Register. 
106 National Exercise Program Implementation Plan, 14. 
107 Ibid. 
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2. Institutionalizing the CAP 
 The CAP System is quite new with DHS making it 
available to the “stakeholder community108 in November 
2006.”109  Although available to stakeholders, the CAP 
system is not yet fully functional.  As a result, it is 
still in its infancy toward fulfilling its intended purpose 
for correcting and improving governmental practices and 
improving preparedness.  However, DHS’ ability to 
institutionalize the program will likely prove difficult.  
The CAP System relies on a high level of cooperation and 
coordination to fix those problems identified, develop 
solutions to those problems, and then implement those 
solutions across multiple organizations.  The CAP System, 
which requires a high degree of interaction and trust 
across government, will be extremely difficult to establish 
and institutionalize.   
 DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner highlights this 
challenge in a statement to the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs in March 2006, discussing 
the difficulties in establishing a fully functional 
corrective actions process: 
The White House, Congress, DHS, FEMA, the Offices 
of Inspector General, the Government 
Accountability Office, the media, and others have 
invested much work in critiquing the federal 
response to Hurricane Katrina…  But those 
“lessons learned” [from Hurricane Katrina] are 
really nothing more than “lessons recognized” 
                     
108 According to the CAPS website, only validated members of the 
homeland security and emergency preparedness community are eligible to 
use the CAP System [https://hseep.dhs.gov/caps/userRegistration.do]. 
109 National Exercise Program Briefing, (Washington D.C.: Department 
of Homeland Security), 11, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/nep.pdf 
(accessed October 10, 2007). 
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until solutions are put in place.  However, 
implementing changes to transform lessons into 
solutions occurs for only a fraction of lessons 
learned, which allows problems to recur as much 
as a decade after they were first recognized.  
Stronger mechanisms are needed to ensure that 
changes are implemented.110 
3. Limitations of the CAP 
 Federal organizations have yet to see whether the CAP 
program is a stronger mechanism. Certain limitations within 
the CAP program may prevent it from achieving its intended 
purpose.  One such limitation is the visibility of actions 
in the CAP System by CAP users.  Currently, CAP users only 
have access and visibility to those items originating or 
assigned to their own section within their organization.  
There is no visibility of organizations working actions 
outside of their section.  As a result, multiple 
organizations could be working on similar actions to 
identify and implement their own solutions with no 
knowledge that other organizations are wrestling the same 
type of problem.  Visibility of corrective actions across 
organizations would allow multiple organizations working 
similar problems to collaborate and work towards a common 
solution.  Visibility also allows organizations to view 
previous worked solutions, which they may use to correct 
actions they themselves experience. 
E. THE U.K. LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS 
 Using the best practices of other nations can be an 
extremely useful means towards implementing DHS’ Cap 
System.  The UK also has a lessons learned process 
developed from exercises and operations.  However, in 
                     
110 Skinner Statement, 19. 
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contrast to DHS, the UK’s Home Office has established a 
comprehensive policy to manage their lessons learned.   
1. Objectives 
 The objectives of their comprehensive framework are as 
follows: 
• To ensure that lessons are identified and acted upon 
at the lowest appropriate level and escalated where 
necessary;  
• To provide a clear link between lessons emerging and 
changes to plans and procedures; 
• To provide a consistent framework for organizations 
to develop their own supporting arrangements for 
identifying and recording lessons learned;  
• To work as far as possible within existing 
structures at local, regional and national level; 
• To clarify responsibility for ensuring that lessons 
are identified and acted upon;  
• To focus, at the national level, on those lessons 
raised that affect the multi-agency response or the 
functioning of key capabilities. 111 
 This policy framework establishes specific practices 
and procedures for identifying, tracking and resolving 
lessons learned within the various levels and departments 
of the UK Government.  This framework also identifies 
protocols for identifying, recording and distributing 
lessons learned at the local and regional government 
                     
111 Civil Contingencies Secretariat, Lessons Identified from UK 
Exercises and Operations – a Policy Framework, (London: United Kingdom 
Cabinet Office, 2006), 2, 
http://www.ukresilience.info/upload/assets/www.ukresilience.info/lesson
s_exercises2.pdf (accessed December 10, 2007). 
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levels, plus coordinating lessons learned activities at the 
national level.112  DHS could easily adopt and modify this 
UK framework for use in identifying, assigning 
responsibility and resolving lessons learned at the local, 
state and national levels. 
2. Effectiveness 
 There are strong indicators of the effectiveness of 
UK’s lessons learned process.  A U.K. Government report 
published in June 2006 identified 54 emergency procedures 
that should be improved based on lessons learned from the 
London Bombings in 2005.  According to Epolitix.com, a 
website providing information on UK politics and 
parliamentary news, a follow-up report in August 2007 
showed that of those 54 recommended improvements, 40 
recommendations were accepted or implemented.113  Although 
this shows progress in resolving these problems, the report 
further noted that UK Government agencies must accomplish 
more in order to resolve the remaining 14 recommendations 
and that it will issue a follow-up report in November 2007.  
This clearly indicates that the U.K. framework not only 
identifies lessons learned, but also identifies and tracks 
corrective actions through resolution, in accordance with 
their established framework. 
F. SUMMARY 
 A significant shortfall affecting the preparedness of 
our nation has been the lack of a corrective action program 
to identify issues, making assignments across organizations 
to resolve the issues, and tracking progress towards 
                     
112 Lessons Identified from UK Exercises, P 3-4. 
113 'Lessons learnt' since London bombings', 
http://www.epolitix.com/EN/News/200708/6b0359fb-8c96-4b33-9c91-
a8110d345e03.htm (accessed February 29, 2008). 
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resolving and implementing those resolutions.  DHS recently 
established its CAP System to fulfill those requirements.  
In order to effectively institutionalize DHS’ CAP System, 
all government departments and agencies, as well as state 
and local governments, must work together to identify 
problems, develop and implement solutions, and disseminate 
those corrective actions to other organizations.  As such, 
heads of departments and agencies, across the federal level 
and state and local officials must be involved in reviewing 
and implementing corrective actions affecting their 
particular organization.   
 Although the CAP Program is a step in the right 
direction, it does have limitations which will likely 
affect its usefulness.  Allowing users to view all working 
actions and solutions will increase collaboration in 
deriving solutions.  As well, it will benefit other 
organizations working solutions to similar problems.   
Another means of improving and institutionalizing the CAP 
Program is to analyze the UK’s lessons learned process and 
incorporate those best practices into the DHS CAP System.   
This includes adopting a similar policy framework as the UK 
to identify, record, and distribute lessons learned at the 
local and regional government levels, plus coordinate 
lessons learned activities at the national level.   
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VI. CONCLUSION AND THE WAY AHEAD 
A. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis was to identify problems 
occurring in the National Exercise Program and to propose 
solutions to correct those problems.  As stated in Chapter 
I, the four areas are inter-related - actions occurring in 
one area can have an impact in any one of the other three 
areas.  Although all four areas are important, based on the 
research conducted, I found funding to have the most 
significant impact.  Funding appears almost to be a “silver 
bullet” when it comes to fixing problems in National-level 
Exercises.  It appears to be almost as simple as fix 
funding and the program is fixed.  However, it is not just 
that simple.  There are other challenges within the NEP 
which funding will not fix – at least in the short term.   
Of the four areas identified, interagency 
participation will be the hardest to achieve.  This is due 
to organizational barriers and cultures which federal 
department and agencies must overcome before the NEP is 
embraced and institutionalized.  Moreover, with all four 
areas being inter-related, lack of interagency 
participation will affect the CAP process, which relies on 
actions across multiple organizations, as well as stability 
and predictability.   
Prior to the publishing of the NEP IMPLAN, there 
existed little specific guidance, policy, or procedures 
regarding planning, conducting, and executing NLEs.  It 
almost seemed ludicrous for DHS to claim a National 
Exercise Program existed when there was no money, policies 
 76
or procedures to run the program.  With the publishing of 
the NEP IMPLAN comes much of the framework necessary to 
adequately administer the NEP.  However, it will still be a 
matter of time before the federal government fully 
implements all aspects of the NEP IMPLAN.  Since an annual 
cycle creates the basis for many of the processes, such as 
schedules and budgeting, it will likely take a couple of 
iterations, and thus a couple of years, to get the 
processes where they need to be in terms of efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
For example, there still is no funding to support 
department and agency participation in NLEs.  The 
organizations participating in NLE 2-08 are funding their 
participation from existing budgets or “out of hide.”  This 
has resulted in lower levels of participation for many of 
the departments and agencies.  
B.  THE WAY AHEAD 
As previously stated, this document identifies and 
addresses four key areas which our government must correct 
in order to make the NEP a viable program for improving our 
Nation’s preparedness.  Chapters II through V, which 
address each key area, contain recommended actions 
necessary to improve the shortfalls in each of those areas.  
With DHS as the lead agency for administering the NEP, it 
will be incumbent on it to implement the changes 
identified.  By following the framework and processes 
contained in the NEP IMPLAN, the NEP with its full-scale 
exercises should continue to grow and become more viable.  
However, DHS faces other challenges in its attempt to 
implement the changes. 
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As stated previously in this chapter, funding is a 
critical piece to fix in the NEP.  Federal Organizations 
must submit budget requirements for their exercise 
participation.  Then DHS must validate that the budget 
requested supports the participation required of that 
organization.  These budget amounts must be included in the 
President’s budget and eventually funded by Congress.  
Fixing funding will go a long way in fixing interagency 
participation. 
The CAP Program must have the support and attention of 
national leaders in order for it to be effective.  
Implementing an effective CAP Program will be a significant 
step forward in interagency participation since it will 
require multiple organizations collaborating on ways to fix 
policies and procedures at the Federal level.  However, 
this will not happen if National leaders do not require 
these changes to occur.   
By fixing exercise funding and implementing the CAP 
system, interagency participation should naturally 
increase.  This will also contribute to improving stability 
and predictability within the NEP.  However, it will not 
happen overnight.  It will likely take years to get the NEP 
to become an accepted and viable means for improving our 
Nation’s preparedness in responding to a terrorist event or 
a natural disaster.   A better and tougher exercise program 
makes us all better and tougher when the real event comes 
along. 
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